Memory programmes: the industrial retention of collective life by Kinsley, Samuel
PUBLISHED: Cultural Geographies. Pre-Press Version. DOI: 10.1177/1474474014555658 	  
Samuel Kinsley, Geography, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK. 
Email: s.kinsley@exeter.ac.uk 
Memory programmes: the industrial 
retention of collective life 
 
Samuel Kinsley 
University of Exeter, UK 
Abstract 
This article argues that in software, we have created quasi-autonomous systems of memory 
that influence how we think about and experience life as such. The role of mediated 
memory in collective life is addressed as a geographical concern through the lens of 
‘programmes’. Programming can mean ordering, and thus making discrete, and scheduling, 
making actions routine. This article addresses how programming mediates the experience 
of memory via networked technologies. Materially recording knowledge, even as electronic 
data, renders thought mentally and spatially discrete and demands systems to order it. 
Recorded knowledge also enables the ordering of spatiotemporal experience both as forms 
of history, thus the sharing of culture, and as the means of imagining futures. We 
increasingly retain information about ourselves and others using digital media. We volunteer 
further information recorded by electronic service providers, search engines and social 
media. Many aspects of our collective lives are now gathered in cities (via closed-circuit 
television, cellphone networks and so on) and retained in databases, constituting a growing 
system of memory of parts of life otherwise forgotten or unthought. Using examples, this 
article argues that in software, we have created industrialised systems of memory that 
influence how we think about living together. 
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Introduction 
This article addresses the ways in which memory in collective life constitutes a particular 
spatial concern through the lens of ‘programmes’. In particular, the role of electronic systems 
that record and store data about what we’re doing, and where we are doing it, is 
interrogated as the quasi-autonomous agency of software. In this regard, and for the 
purposes of this article, I suggest that programming can mean two things: ordering, and so 
making things discrete, and scheduling, and so making actions routine. Thus, I want to think 
about how programming mediates the experience of memory via networked technologies 
that routinely act as an external memory: as prosthetic devices for the capture and retention 
of data about our lives. In particular, the aim of this article is to critically address this as a 
kind of ‘industrialisation of memory’, following the philosopher Bernard Stiegler.1 
Increasing amounts of information about us is gathered using electronic devices, and we 
volunteer further information that is recorded by Internet service providers, search engines and 
social-networking systems. Many aspects of our collective lives are captured in cities (via closed-
circuit television (CCTV), phone networks and so on) and retained in databases, as a growing 
system of memory of life otherwise forgotten or unthought. Software programmes thus have 
significant agency in the various ways in which we collectively communicate and remember. 
Materially recording knowledge (even as electronic data) renders thought mentally and spatially 
discrete and demands systems to order it. Indeed, those processes of ordering themselves play 
increasingly significant roles in contemporary collective spatial experience. Recorded knowledge 
also facilitates the ordering of time both as forms of history, and thus the sharing of culture, and 
as the means of anticipating and planning for futures. The logic of retained knowledge is thus 
‘programmatic’ and has arguably become more so with the advent of software programmes, 
which augment our capacities to ‘remember’ information. 
Cultural geography has broadly engaged with the theorisation and study of memory in terms 
of embodied sensibilities of recollection and forgetting and in terms of places charged with 
memory. In particular, memory has been addressed as an integral part of everyday life.2 As 
Jones3 has noted, such research has focused upon a range of spatial registers, including national 
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identity,4 its commemoration and contestation,5 urban space,6 historical landscapes,7 tourist 
landscapes8 and place and memorialisation.9 Within this work, there has been two principal foci: 
the psychological and somatic situation of memory as a capacity, and particular landscapes or 
spatial formations (memorials, monuments–both naturally occurring and human-made) that 
function as shared symbolic repositories – kept alive through cultural activities and traditions. 
The fact that contemporary digital technologies mediate increasing aspects of our collective lives 
both challenges and develops such understandings of memory. The aim of this article is to 
interrogate some key elements of how software has become a means of ‘industrialising’ memory. 
This industrialisation of memory involves conserving and transmitting extraordinary amounts 
of data, captured and volunteered in everyday life, and operationalising it in large-scale systems 
– constituting novel sociotechnical collectives which have begun to influence how we perform 
our lives such that they can be recorded and retained. 
To investigate the programmatic nature of our mediatised collective memory, this article is 
structured in three parts. In the following, section ‘Industrial-memory apparatuses’, a number of 
technologies are explored as means of capturing, operating upon and retaining our everyday 
activities in ‘industrial-scale’ systems of memory. Particular attention is paid to the quasi-
autonomous agency of these systems, that appear to operate at a scale and speed that exceeds a 
human capacity of oversight. In section ‘Mnemotechnics’, the mnemonic capabilities of 
networked technologies of digital mediation are brought into focus to be examined as 
‘mnemotechnologies’, technologies and technical supports that both support and reterritorialise 
what we collectively understand about our everyday lives. The conclusion considers how an 
‘industrialisation of memory’ both challenges and transforms the ways in which we negotiate 
the spaces of collective life. 
Industrial-memory apparatuses 
The 20th century is the century of the industrialisation, the conservation and the 
transmission – that is, the selection – of memory. This industrialisation becomes 
concretized in the generalisation of the production of industrial temporal objects 
(phonograms, films, radio and television programs, etc).10 
From governmental systems for taxation and welfare to supermarkets, banks and credit-
scoring agencies, many aspects of our lives are being monitored and recorded through the 
proxy of our pecuniary activities. CCTV networks, transport ticketing and traffic-
management systems retain traces of our travel patterns. We volunteer further information 
to search engines and social media, and we have recently learned much of these data have 
also been captured and stored by government security agencies.11 Nevertheless, there is an 
equally ‘hyper-consumerist exploitation of data’.12 Many aspects of our lives are collected in 
databases variously owned by private and public organisations and institutions. 
Constituting a growing system of memory – a memory of parts of life that might be 
otherwise forgotten or unthought. It also facilitates a perpetual operation on memory, 
iteratively reterritorialising what is understood about our lives. The software programmes 
that drive digital media, and those that create them, thus have significant agency in the ways 
we collectively communicate and remember. What is collected is retained and also 
transmitted – folded into other datasets and utilised for civic and commercial purposes. In 
this section, I want to focus on systems of mediated memory activities that are being 
constituted through networked technologies and the software that enables them to function. 
We might think about such systems in several ways. The capturing of data for retention 
constitutes what Kitchin and Dodge call ‘capta’: ‘units . . . selected . . . from the sum of all 
potential data . . . [They are] what is selectively captured through measurement’.13 We can be 
passively enrolled or actively enrol ourselves into systems that constitute capta. For example, 
CCTV systems are forms of passive collection that do not require any interaction with those 
being surveilled.14 By contrast, social-networking systems function, mostly, through 
voluntary contribution insofar as they require users to post information. Capta collection 
activities thus feature both explicitly and implicitly in everyday life activities. 
Capta collection creates systems that blur the distinction between individual and 
collective. Individual records of activity are kept, where they provide value, but those 
individual records are always already a part of much larger aggregated systems, which 
retain a collective memory of activity – statistically derived averages of activities of people 
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who are variously grouped.15 For example, e-commerce websites with ‘recommendation 
systems’ use both individual purchasing histories and average patterns of purchasing 
(derived from all of the records of consumers in the system) to offer recommendations. 
Individual traces of activity, retained outside of the more commonly discussed somatic 
memory, are, in this sense, never left alone, they are selected, aggregated and transformed to 
produce forms of collective memory – something like a memory of habits. 
As others have variously observed,16 these industrial capta-gathering systems have 
significant implications for the understanding and study of privacy and surveillance and the 
various institutional and territorial legal processes governing such systems.17 While such 
considerations fall outside of the scope of this article, it is worth noting a few things in 
passing: First, what constitutes ‘public’ and ‘private’ data in the systems discussed here, and 
thus the definition of surveillance, is blurred. Technologies are developed and adopted at a 
pace that has made it difficult for social norms of privacy to adapt.18 For example, we 
increasingly volunteer relatively personal data to social-networking systems that have 
ambiguous privacy settings, so it can be surprising how ‘public’ your data can be. Second, 
the systems discussed here are of significant interest to social scientists precisely because of 
their scale and reach: they have large populations of subjects/users and lots of data about 
them. However, performing research with such data, and the companies that own them, can 
pose significant questions about ethics.19 Third, the systems discussed here rely on an 
increasing number and scale of data centres with a capacity for interconnection through 
international telecommunications infrastructures to large numbers of portable and 
embedded devices that has transformed their scope and reach. Physical location determines 
the territorial jurisdiction for the governance of not only the equipment but also the data 
stored therein, determining how that data can be used – often in ways the subjects of that 
data may not know or desire.20 
To explore the properties of what has been proposed as an emerging system of 
industrialised memory, the rest of this section will focus on three particular examples. First, a 
well-established supermarket-loyalty-card system is interrogated as a rather opaque system 
that operates on vast stores of aggregated and individual ‘capta’ to both predict and 
influence purchasing behaviour. Second, Facebook is discussed in relation to the ways in 
which volunteered ‘capta’ are stored and represented in ‘timelines’ that constitute a peculiar 
topology. Third, and finally, the increasing array of capta-collection systems in cities is 
investigated as repositories intended to constitute what has been referred to as the ‘real-time’ 
or ‘smart’ city. 
Memory consumption: ‘every little helps’ 
During the 1990s, a number of retailers sought to form ongoing, intimate, relationships with 
consumers. Loyalty cards remain central to ‘customer relationship marketing’ strategies, 
forming sophisticated assemblages, including call centres, websites, data centres and 
databases, product warehouses and supply-chain-management software, tills, printing 
facilities and the materials they produce and various analytical techniques to coordinate 
these ‘customer relationship’ activities. The claim for such systems is that retailers ‘know’ 
consumers and respond to them individually, the desired result of which is apparently 
‘deeper’ relationships and the formation of ‘bonds of loyalty’.21 
In 2011, Tesco were the largest UK retailer, and the third largest in the world.22 One of the 
largest private-sector employers in the United Kingdom, Tesco purportedly takes one in 
every seven pounds spent in UK shops.23 Tesco argue that their success is due to ‘listening’ 
to their customers: 
Our new conversation with customers . . . is about listening to what they want, to how 
they’re living their lives today, and then adapting and building the business accordingly: 
as we have said for years, ‘Every Little Helps’.24 
As Antony Beckett suggests, ‘the notion of listening is central to Tesco’s explanation of 
their success and . . . that strategy is captured in their advertising strapline “Every Little 
Helps”’.25 The ‘listening’ at the heart of this venture is not a one-to-one mode of listening but 
instead a ‘listening’ to, and remembering, the vast amount of data that they collect, every day, 
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through their ‘Clubcard’ system: ‘Thanks to Clubcard . . . we have unique insights into how 
our customers’ behaviour is changing’.26 
Launched in 1995, Clubcard is one of the largest UK loyalty-card schemes.27 Tesco sends 
vouchers to the more than 16 million UK Clubcard-holders, as well as money-off (date-
limited) coupons that are based upon their spending habits and the spending habits of the 
lifestyle groupings by which Tesco categorises its customers.28 Thus, the ‘Every Little Helps’ 
promise is ambiguous. Tesco suggest they ‘listen’ to customers, remember their choices and 
make goods available, and cheaper, at particular times and in particular places. Yet, it is clear 
from Tesco’s own ‘Media Team’ – which sells access to these data to third-parties29 – that 
Tesco use these data to position certain kinds of consumer behaviour as a norm for other 
consumers to follow: ‘ Clubcard media enables brands to: Talk directly to your existing 
shoppers, retain loyalty and grow their spend [and] Acquire prospective customers who are 
identified as potential trialists based on products they normally buy’.30 
According to a cofounder of DunnHumby (the data-mining company that developed 
Clubcard, now owned by Tesco), the resulting ‘customer relationship model’ known as 
Tesco ‘Customer Lifestyles’31 
is ultimately about trying to understand factors that drive shopping behavior, . . . together 
with measurement of Tesco’s share of a customer’s wallet or purse . . . We wanted to 
capture more spend from each customer, and nudge them into buying products from 
Tesco that they might buy elsewhere.32 
A detailed longitudinal dataset has been and continues to be accumulated that operates at 
both the level of detail of individual consumers and also at the level of aggregated market 
‘segment’ categorisations, configured according to a typology of consumers.33 This is, of 
course, more than a log of activity. The capta stored by Tesco are continually analysed in 
order to influence future behaviour. The detailed records of individual and aggregated 
consumer activity become the object of calculation according to particular kinds of profiling, 
accomplished through algorithms. 
Clubcard began with segmentation through traditional profiling methods, extrapolating 
from focus-group feedback combined with actual purchase data. Since 2001, with lowering 
technical costs, the whole dataset of more than ‘104 billion rows of data stored at any one 
time’34 is mined for the purchasing patterns of individuals and their responses to 
personalised marketing efforts. The growth of the dataset and the speed of harvesting and 
processing data allow algorithms to iteratively refine typologies of consumers, accelerating 
attempts to influence shopping habits. The feedback between the growing digital ‘memory’ 
of Clubcard databases and customer offers constitutes consumers as an evolving entity: ‘The 
impact of marketing efforts can now be minutely recorded and analysed on an individual, 
store and geographic [territory] basis’.35 
The Clubcard databases and their use in profiling customers to intervene in their daily 
habits produce kinds of commercial spaces, evident in two ways. First, particular kinds of 
commercial spatial experience interconnect supermarkets, homes and websites and apps 
(through Internet-connected devices). Timespaces of consumption are not necessarily 
specific to topographic locations. The place of ‘convenience’ shopping is (and has been for 
some time) untethered from the ‘bricks and mortar’ shop.36 Instead, it is topologically 
positioned between websites, databases and data warehouses; banks and payment networks; 
shops, homes and so on, often outside of traditional opening hours. Into such assemblages 
are enfolded detailed and increasingly intimate capacities of memory: of preferences 
(perhaps even desires) and habits. 
Second, the fast-paced data gathered, minute-by-minute, about consumers and the 
attendant, more-sedately generated, data concerning shop infrastructures and environs are 
shaped by Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Indeed, it is through the combination of 
in-house data and those derived from commercial geo-demographic segmentation systems (a 
combination of socio-economic data with GIS facilitating analyses of particular market 
segmentations – such as CACI’s ACORN, Experian’s Mosaic and Compusearch’s PRISM) 
that supermarkets decide on the location of stores.37 Such systems generate peculiar 
boundaries across territories, as represented in the GIS models manipulated by Tesco (and 
many others), that transform the uses of space – with the models pointing to the location of a 
superstore in a particular location, rather than any other, based upon segmentation analysis. 
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Through ever-expanding databases and algorithms that continually analyse them, Tesco 
can perform iterated ‘experiments’ to refine segment typologies and strategies for targeting 
them. The ‘geography’ within such databases is an indexical attribute, organised at 
normative scales (such as store, post code, city and so on); it is one of many lines of 
segmentation, serving the targeting of offers, advertising campaigns and delivery of goods. 
The geographical imaginary Clubcard invokes is of populations of consumers, segmented by 
lifestyle preferences and socio-economic factors, distributed and delimited (or ‘bordered’) 
through particular categorisations of space. The consumer is thus enrolled into an industrial 
system that retains habits of consumption in significant detail, both at an individual and 
collective scale, and operates on that historiography in order to influence prospective future 
habits.38 
Performing a social graph 
Online social-networking systems, such as Facebook and Twitter, are repositories of 
quotidian reportage of everyday activity, from birthday wishes to holiday snaps, marriage 
announcements and memorials to lamented friends and relatives.39 Facebook in particular 
has encouraged a systematisation of peoples’ social lives mediated by their platform. Users 
enrol themselves into ‘networks’ associated with institutions and workplaces, subscribe to 
‘pages’ concerning their interests, play games together, organise ‘events’ and even buy and 
sell their possessions.40 Facebook’s databases retain each activity, forming a growing 
repository of associations between people and other entities. Facebook uses this vast 
databased representation of users’ mediated lives to target advertising at them according to 
patterns in data they themselves have volunteered. Furthermore, through the Facebook 
‘platform’, launched in 2007, this repository of data is for sale, and third-party developers are 
able to integrate their own sites and services with the ‘platform’. 
At the 2010 Facebook developer conference, f8, Facebook launched the ‘Open Graph’ 
protocol, developed to facilitate connections between people, places and things, or their 
media representations, on Facebook.41 Open Graph consists of the protocol: a system of rules 
for the connection of entities in the database; an Application Programming Interface (API): a 
software gateway for any other online object or system; and what are called ‘social plug-ins’ 
– principally the now-ubiquitous ‘Like’ button. Open Graph enables Facebook to capture, 
retain and process user data across the whole web, not only within the bounds of the 
Facebook website, through the implementation of the API and social plug-ins. 
Facebook developers refer to the networks of associations mapped through Facebook as 
the ‘social graph’. ‘Graph’ refers here to the topological structure of ‘nodes’ within the 
network and ‘edges’, which are the connections between them: ‘nodes refer to individual 
users and edges to the so-called friendship relations between users’.42 However, human 
relations are only one among many kinds of edges in Facebook’s graph: nodes can also refer 
to other entities, such as companies, schools, products, events, songs, topographically 
defined locations and so on. The definition and ordering of these edges is governed and 
maintained by the Open Graph protocol and associated algorithms that form a central part of 
Facebook. This is a world-ing: both a modelling of and intervention into the forms of spatial 
experience of its users. Facebook is thus proactively seeking to constitute, albeit in a 
reductive and commercialised manner, what Massey calls a ‘global sense of place’: ‘a 
particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular 
locus’.43 What Open Graph convenes is a topological model of everyday (mediated) life, 
which is always being captured and retained. 
Whereas Facebook was initially a singular website, with representations within it of other 
sites and entities (from companies to products and so on), Open Graph enables Facebook to 
be an infrastructure for connecting entities, however they are represented online. Thus Open 
Graph is what Bucher calls ‘a centralized architecture that generates value by decentralized 
social action’.44 For Facebook, the API and social plug-ins are ‘edge creating devices’, 
facilitating capta harvesting by the Facebook platform. Open Graph thus constitutes a form 
of memory not only of the encoded representations of entities (people, organisations, places, 
things and so on) but also of associations between those entities, a kind of topological 
memory. 
The year after Open Graph was launched, at the 2011 f8 conference, Mark Zuckerberg, 
CEO of Facebook, gave a keynote presentation introducing further changes to the platform.45 
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In particular, Zuckerberg outlined changes to the organisation of users’ profiles as a 
historiographic (or perhaps hagiographic) ‘timeline’ and updates to Open Graph, with more 
emphasis on how Facebook links with other systems. Open Graph initially relied upon 
modelling relationships through explicit interactions between entities represented within 
Facebook, particularly via the ‘Like’ button. The revised Open Graph includes a semantics of 
interaction to accommodate an implicit, or passive, recording of activity. Verbs such as 
‘read’, ‘watch’, ‘listen’ and ‘buy’ were introduced to articulate a ‘frictionless sharing’ of 
activities mediated through systems interconnected with Facebook through Open Graph.46 
For example, when a user reads an article using a newspaper app that is connected to 
Facebook, that user’s timeline is updated to reflect that ‘[user name] has read [article name]’. 
Topographical location can be appended to such activities too: ‘[user name] is/was in/at 
[location]’. The topographical location is merely another point of capta, and thus another 
entity in the database that can generate edges. 
Facebook, like other capta-harvesting ‘social’ systems, has become a system for capturing 
and in some way ‘remembering’ the various activities of everyday life, modelled as 
relationships (edges) between encoded entities (nodes). Facebook as an interface to social 
activities is also, importantly, a representation of those activities and the relationships they 
imply. In order to sort, prioritise and display ‘timelines’ and ‘news feeds’, Facebook has 
integrated a set of algorithms within Open Graph referred to as ‘EdgeRank’. The purpose of 
EdgeRank is to sort and rank the relative importance of ‘edges’, relationships between nodes 
in the database (people, organisations, places, etc.), in order to prioritise the visibility of 
particular ‘events’. Thus, every time an interaction happens within Facebook – a user posts 
something, mentions another ‘node’ and so on – EdgeRank assigns values to the 
relationships implied (the edges).47 Through Open Graph and EdgeRank, Facebook is not 
only an industrial-scale system that retains many aspects of its users’ lives, it is also, perhaps 
more significantly, a system for the recollection of that ‘memory’, translated through a 
programmatic logic. The performance of spatiality inferred by Facebook’s Open Graph and 
EdgeRank can be accordingly thought of as a kind of programmatic or mechanistic topology, 
every-thing (every data point) consists in relation to others. There is no presence and 
absence, merely different kinds of relation. 
Tracing the city 
There has been a growth in the popular discourse and policy rhetoric concerning the 
governance and management of cities through network technologies. With declining costs of 
technological devices and the growth of embedding information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) into urban infrastructures and street furniture has come the proposition 
of the ‘smart city’. The moniker ‘smart city’, as a form of discursive regime, freights a 
number of interconnected discourses that justify and perpetuate particular understandings 
of what constitutes the ‘smart-ness’ of an urban environment, the socio-spatial conditions 
that can enable its development and who has the authority to name a city ‘smart’.48 These 
discourses include commercial agendas for ‘Smart Cities’, aggressively marketed by 
corporations like Cisco, IBM and Siemens, among others, to sell ‘intelligent’ automated 
systems to manage urban utilities and infrastructures,49 future-oriented research agendas for 
the development of ubiquitous computing to enable ‘smarter’ ways of living50 and emerging 
systems of technocratic (urban) governance.51 
The capabilities for creating ‘smart cities’ have developed in parallel and in relation to the 
development of technologies for large-scale collection, storage and processing of data.52 
Whereas, as Harvey Miller suggests,53 much of what we know about cities has been derived 
from specially commissioned studies characterised by data scarcity, the capacities of 
embedded networked technologies for the urban environment are marketed as a means of 
large-scale, ongoing data collection.54 Networked infrastructures are thus characterised as a 
means for ‘urban informatics’, a ‘smart’ and real-time system for governing cities. Alongside 
civic and governmental applications for such technologies, many commercial applications 
have been conceived for the monitoring of populations for targeting advertising. If the 
examples of loyalty cards and social media are largely concerned with the industrialisation 
of memory as a capture and retention of individual activities, then the emergence of city-
scale ‘big data’ systems constitutes a different kind of industrial-scale memory principally 
concerned with aggregated populations: something like a ‘municipal memory’. 
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As Kitchin notes, there has long been a production of large datasets for marketing, 
distribution and sales as well as for the purposes of governance. However, these datasets are 
not generated continuously, frequently rely upon sampling, often aggregated in broad 
geographical areas and so function as coarse snapshots.55 What constitutes contemporary 
‘big’ data has not been clearly defined, but very broadly, it can connote datasets requiring 
bespoke systems for collection, processing and storage. Furthermore, Kitchin has identified 
some of the definitions of ‘big data’ found in relevant literature as very large in volume 
(petabytes of data), high in velocity (created in real-time), exhaustive in scope (striving to 
capture entire populations, or at least very large sample sizes), very detailed in resolution, 
and relational in nature, enabling the conjoining of different datasets.56 In addition to these 
factors, innovation in code and programming languages, and the ontologies or schema by 
which they are defined, has constituted ‘metadata’ formats – data that describe data – to 
facilitate interoperability through translation and transformation between code types. 
There are a number of modes of data collection that undergird the emergence of what is 
being called ‘smart’ city infrastructure, that illustrate the scales – of computation, data, 
labour, infrastructure, topography and so on – at which ‘urban informatics’ is required to 
operate. It is the combination of not only broadening the resolution, scope and scales but also 
the speed of data collection that facilitates the institution of an emerging municipal memory. 
Kitchin articulates a typology of three sources for ‘big’ data that (can) drive ‘smart city’ 
systems: ‘automated’, where data are collected by software-driven systems – such as 
Automated Number Plate Recognition; ‘directed’, where data are collected by systems 
controlled by a skilled operator – such as CCTV; and ‘volunteered’, where data are provided 
by those previously surveilled, voluntarily, perhaps in exchange for value provided by a 
service based on those data – such as social media, like Facebook. 
While ‘directed’ systems for harvesting capta have a long history – we might, for example, 
include censuses in this category – the scale and sophistication with which contemporary 
automated and volunteered ‘big’ data collection is taking place is relatively novel. ‘Big’ 
datasets have been made possible by the inclusion of techniques to embed individual and 
traceable identifiers on and into everything from public transit tickets (e.g. the London 
Oyster card) to cars (number plates), networked sensors distributed into the city to report 
back data57 and a shift in culture towards a tolerance for making previously private activities 
conspicuous through personal technologies (such as location-based services like 
Foursquare). This combination of data-collection systems has been envisioned as 
‘constellations of instruments across many scales that are connected through multiple 
networks which provide continuous data regarding the movements of people and 
materials’58 that, importantly here, is retained and stored constitutes a significant aspect of an 
industrialisation of memory. 
The kinds of automated systems being built into the everyday urban environment are not 
limited to the provision of services or the governance of public space but also include those 
specifically designed to put urban populations under surveillance for commercial purposes. 
There are systems where a form of surveillance can arise as a by-product: data are collected 
for the operation of a system that can then be repurposed by virtue of their metadata. For 
example, public transit systems increasingly operate with individualised ‘smart’ cards, with 
a unique identifier encoded into them, for payment purposes, which facilitates a form of 
tracking. In addition, processing pre-existing datasets to infer further information, such as 
location, there are also technologies for which surveillance for marketing and sales purposes 
is the principal goal. A number of digital systems are being inserted into everyday spaces 
that attempt to calculate our bodily dispositions for commercial gain. For example, the 
company QuiVidi have created a system ‘automated audience measurement’ system, 
‘VidiCube’, that purportedly can track people near billboards using cameras to discern if and 
how long people look at adverts, and demographic distribution (specifically age and gender, 
with scope for further categorisations) of the ‘audience’.59 This technology is currently being 
implemented by a British company, Amscreen, specialising in in-shop-advertising screens to 
be used in forecourt and retail-convenience stores, leisure centres and healthcare waiting 
areas.60 The ‘Footpath’ system created by Path Intelligence uses passive mobile phone signal 
detection to track movements through shopping centres in order to track consumer 
behaviour.61 Similarly, the suite of tools created by ShopperTrak uses both video footage and 
the electromagnetic communications systems commonly used by smart phones to track 
consumer behaviour. These tracking capta are then combined with sales data to provide 
8 
analytics for how long people dwell in a shop, queue management, customer loyalty, 
effective use of labour and how these variously correlate with sales.62 These systems have 
been implemented by in a number of shopping centres across the world.63 
Through the systems that are being increasingly installed over large topographical (urban) 
areas and potentially collecting very large quantities of capta, detailed representations of 
urban populations and spaces are made possible. Furthermore, the interoperability of 
datasets through metadata makes ‘markets’ of data possible, and enables even greater detail. 
These ‘big’ data stores can be processed in order to feed back relevant information to a given 
population so that they can benefit, such as for planning travel. However, such detail also 
enables previously ambiguous spaces to be transformed into spaces of highly targeted 
advertising. What I have tentatively called municipal memory then, is not only, or 
necessarily, large archives or databases of a huge numbers of individuals’ behaviours, 
updated in real-time, but also, due to the scope, scale and interoperability involved, an 
emerging form of collective memory, in which the urban subject is simultaneously conceived 
of as both singular and multiple, individual and municipal. 
* 
This section explored an emerging assemblage of mediated memory activities constituted 
through networked technologies. This assemblage involves the capture and retention of 
information, increasingly in real-time, about us as both individuals and populations, 
collected passively, automatically and by our volition, and aggregated and concatenated via 
metadata. Collectively, these memory apparatuses facilitate large-scale operations on what is 
remembered about us, how we can recall it and to what ends it is put to use, commercially 
and privately. In order to interrogate these industrial-memory apparatuses, the next section 
develops an understanding of memory as a prosthetic capacity through the 
conceptualisation of ‘mnemotechnics’ by the philosopher Bernard Stiegler. 
Mnemotechnics 
We exteriorise ever more cognitive functions in contemporary mnemotechnical 
equipment. And in so doing, we delegate more and more knowledge to apparatuses and 
to the service industries that network them, control them, formalise them, model them and 
perhaps even destroy them.64 
In the Phaedrus dialogue, Socrates argues that the exteriorisation of memory, in the form of 
writing, is both a loss of memory and of knowledge – a loss, one might argue, that we 
experience on a daily basis in the contemporary epoch. Equally, in the progressive 
industrialisation of text, as print then its digitisation and subsequent transmission via the 
Internet, following Bernard Stiegler, the exteriorised human memory ‘seems to have become 
something we can reactivate and access ad infinitum’.65 Through his articulation of a 
technogenetic understanding of the human,66 Stiegler provides a means of critically engaging 
with the ‘industrial model’ through which memory undergoes a fundamental 
transformation. This section explicates and then applies Bernard Stiegler’s philosophy of 
technology and memory to critically engage with the industrialisation of memory explored 
(above) as the creation of an assemblage of industrial-memory apparatuses. 
We can begin with an understanding of technics as the co-constitutive relation between 
‘the human’ and ‘the technical’. As both James Ash and I have outlined elsewhere,67 for 
Stiegler, it is through the exteriorisation of thought, through language and gesture, that we 
understand our internal conscious processes and this exteriorisation is achieved through 
technologies of language and writing. There is accordingly an irresolvable contradiction or 
absence of origin of the human in this relationship of exteriorisation, the human does not 
come before the technical and vice versa, they are co-constituted and continue to be so. Stiegler 
argues that ‘[w]hat is exteriorised is constituted in its very exteriorisation and is preceded by 
no interiority: this is the logic of the supplement’.68 As Stiegler argues,69 ‘technics is the 
horizon of all possibility’ and an aporia of origin. 
A mental reality, or a ‘technical mentality’ following Gilbert Simondon,70 can thereby be 
‘projected onto a support that is neither cerebral nor psychical but rather technical’, which 
Stiegler calls the process of ‘mnemotechnics’.71 Technics accordingly is the constitution of the 
experience of temporality as the relation between the body, technology and the environment. 
Stiegler suggests these forms of ‘retention’ precede us and yet they are a part of us – there are 
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forms of retention that were created long before the birth of an individual and yet that 
person can access them as a form of ‘cultural memory’.72 
Drawing upon Husserl’s account of the consciousness of temporality constituted by 
retention and protention73 Stiegler calls the materialisation of thought, exterior to the mind 
and body, ‘tertiary memory’. For Husserl, retention is considered in two parts: primary and 
secondary retention. Primary retention is the fixing of experience in the immediate 
conscious. Secondary retention is the weaving together of the various memorial contents that 
make up what we call memory. Together with these forms of retention as a part of ongoing 
conscious experience, we project forward and anticipate, forming ‘protentions’.74 Departing 
from Husserl, Stiegler includes ‘tertiary retention’ as the mnemotechnical exteriorisation of 
secondary retentions. However, because we are born into a world already filled with 
technical objects ‘tertiary retention always already precedes the constitution of primary and 
secondary retention’.75 With this exteriorisation of thought comes its material spatialisation, 
as it is recorded in material form and, rendered discrete as prosthetic memory. One might 
suggest that when graphic practices produced spatially fixed pictures and writings (as 
monuments, carvings, painted walls and so on), such forms of exteriorisation, when 
collectively constituted, historically composed the kinds of ‘pause’ or ‘permanence’ that 
constitute place for Tuan and Harvey respectively.76 
Exteriorisation also involves an anticipation of its further use, folding into processes of 
protention and thus stimulating forms of spatial imagination. The ongoing development of 
the human is thus always and already in relation to the technical, and what Stiegler calls the 
‘organised inorganic matter’ of tertiary retention. The mnemotechnical is transformed, 
deepened and rendered more complex with our ongoing development. Primary and 
secondary retention are increasingly of experiences of mnemotechnical forms, especially 
media. Thus, Stiegler’s supplement of ‘tertiary retention’ to Husserl’s phenomenology is of 
significant importance for thinking the phenomenality of a range of collectively mediated 
phenomena. In particular, in relation to the programmatic capacities of digital technologies, 
exteriorised ‘tertiary memory’ is not peculiar to an individual but shared and highly 
reproducible. 
Spatiotemporal distance between those recalling and what is recalled is collapsed, and a 
memory is iteratively reterritorialised in the moments of its recollection, over-determining it 
with the metadata of capture, storage and retrieval. The phenomenality of a given experience 
is necessarily over-coded with chrono-referential and geo-referential data, specified by 
technical infrastructures: audio, images and video become geo-coded as a matter of course, 
with many devices appending global positioning system (GPS) coordinates into their 
metadata by default. While the immediate spatial experience of capturing memories as 
digital photos and so on is not particularly different from the ‘analogue’ experience, it is the 
instauration of widespread, faster and increasingly automated capture, storage and 
recollection processes, programmatically, that calls for further study. 
In what remains of this section, I want to use the idea of programmes to think through the 
ways in which the increasingly digitised mnemotechnical apparatus has constituted what 
Stiegler has addressed as an industrialisation of memory.77 This industrialisation is largely 
concerned with what Stiegler identifies as an epochal shift away from a historical culture 
that has been rooted in the linearity of writing. Stiegler differentiates this historical culture 
from a currently emerging epoch 
in which the retention of the past passes primarily through the technical systems of 
analogical . . . and digital communications media and other technically mediated 
perceptions.78 
If our experience of historical time, as the linear reasoning of phenomenological sensations 
of temporality, is fundamentally rooted in mnemotechnics, then, Stiegler argues, the flow of 
history itself is constituted by a process in which dominant technical systems develop and 
are accompanied by new cultural forms that are programmed by those systems. This 
programming is not only the mnemotechnical ordering of discretised information, 
historically as writing and perhaps more recently in the form of databases. Such a 
programming is also concerned with the routinisation of activity, of constituting rhythms by 
which activities are organised and comprehended. 
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As addressed above, it is clear that we increasingly retain information about ourselves and 
others using digital media and volunteer yet more information that is recorded by Internet 
and media service providers, search engines, social media and retailers. Thus, many aspects 
of our lives become ‘capta’ in data stores and databases. This facilitates a kind of perpetual 
operation on memory, iteratively reterritorialising what is understood about our collective 
lives for various purposes in the ever-moving present. 
These (mnemotechnical) media increasingly operate in the process of ‘event-isation’,79 
intervening in our ongoing spatiotemporal experience and clearly reshaping the processes of 
retention. The effect of presence is manipulated by contemporary digital media: an 
experienced event and its capture in a mnemotechnical apparatus coincide in time, such that, 
simultaneously, digital technologies inaugurate a new collective, in the process of capturing, 
ordering and distribution, as well as individual experience of timespace as a departure from 
historicity. We might think here of the now-common sight of people at live events 
experiencing them through the lens of their camera-phones, simultaneously experiencing the 
moment and enframing and recording (perhaps even streaming) that experience for social 
media systems. 
Social and spatial software programmes attempt to ‘produce’ timespace by selecting what 
merits identification as an ‘event’. Information has value as the heirarchisation of ‘what 
happens’: By selecting what is called an ‘event’, the (software) programmes, and the 
commercial interests they represent, co-produce the access to ‘what happens’. The Facebook 
‘news feed’ is just such a quasi-automated system of selection of events. This is, of course, 
nothing new. Contemporary media co-produce what happens, for example, as 24-hour 
rolling news, and in this sense anticipate what is going to happen. This merely reflects the 
ways memory traverses primary and secondary retentions: ‘the actions, decisions, facts and 
events through which one got here’ do not remain in the present’s past but always already 
preceded it – without determining it.80 
What perhaps is novel is that the widespread industrial systems of retention, and social 
media in particular, predetermine events in their encoded rules of functionality. When the 
conditions of memorisation, what Stiegler calls the ‘criteria of effacement’ – selection, 
retention–protention and ultimately attention81 – are all concentrated in one techno-
industrial system, that system determines rules of participation and hence conditions 
retentional activities. Software, such as the mobile phone apps for Facebook, or Google Plus, 
and even the Tesco Clubcard – and the protocol-logical software infrastructure that 
interconnects them with many other systems – facilitate the apparently easy recording of 
activities and events. However, such software can predetermine the nature of such events. 
Users, or ‘actors’, ‘anticipate the conditions of their acts’ recordability and act according to 
the constraints of this industrial façade of time’ and space.82 We have begun to organise how 
we address and perform activities according to how they can be captured using 
mnemotechnical systems. 
Returning to the example of people at ‘live’ events simultaneously recording and 
experiencing the event through the mediation of a technical device such as a camera-phone, 
it is not only that the device is ready-to-hand, and thus used instinctively, but also that we 
are forming a habit of using such mediating devices (and the programmes that enable them) 
and assume their use when we plan to attend an event, or perform an activity. So, many of 
us convene our own spatialities of a given event with the criteria of its recording and sharing 
with digital media. We have internalised the logic of the ‘criteria of effacement’ to such an 
extent that it is woven through many aspects of our spatial experience. For example, when 
attending an event, we might (consciously or otherwise) select outfits because they are 
photogenic, pick spots to stand because they are good for photos and video or have a better 
phone signal for access to social media and so on. 
Furthermore, the passive collection of data through the integrated systems of the APIs of 
social-networking systems like Facebook’s Social Graph begin to ask questions about the 
scheme of retentional capture outlined in Stiegler’s reading of Husserl. If activities are 
discretised at the very moment of action, without the need for somatic retention by the 
embodied user, the selection process from secondary to tertiary retention becomes short-
circuited. The increasing passive recording and sorting of mediated activities through the 
plethora of networked sensing, and recording apparatuses, therefore prompt interesting 
questions about the protentional force of the industrial fabrication of timespace. Such 
systems arguably suspend the possibility of distinguishing between an ‘event’ and its 
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‘capture’, its induction into memory (whether primary, secondary or tertiary), or between its 
‘capture’ and its ‘reception’ or recall.83 Indeed, Stiegler argues that in such cases, ‘these three 
moments coincide in a single spatiotemporal reality such that all delay, all distance, between 
them is eliminated’.84 If historicity is the process of translating an event, its entering as data 
and then its reception or reading, it is a process of deferral (gaps of varying degrees between 
those steps). Such deferrals allow for deliberative processes of selection in the mediation of 
artefactual memory. Thus, the advent of network technologies that capture and transmit and 
facilitate ‘recall’ with only an infinitesimal delay between them (the speed of light) engage a 
different process of selection routines for the retention and reception of ‘events’. Therefore, 
the programmatic industrialisation of memory, through the algorithms and protocols of 
digital media, not only operates in the post facto enframing and sorting of data for its 
transmission (by the Facebook ‘EdgeRank’ or Path Intelligence ‘Footpath’ algorithms for 
example) but also in the moment, by virtue of their use to capture and mediate in ‘real-time’. 
This quasi-autonomous ‘programming’ of memory, through the opaque, large-scale and 
widespread systems discussed here, appears to operate at a scale and speed that exceeds a 
human capacity of oversight. 
Following Stiegler then, and to conclude this section, we might begin to question how the 
shift towards the primacy of industrialised-digital memory is affecting our ways of 
understanding the past and anticipating a future and thus our geographic imaginaries and 
forms of spatial imagination. Furthermore, we might ask, with Stiegler, whether such 
processes have begun to ‘inaugurate a different experience of time[space], [and] new and 
different mode[s] of [spatiality and] temporalisation’.85 
Conclusion 
As the new digital mappings wash across our world, perhaps we should ask about the 
worlds that are being produced, . . . the conceptions of history with which they work, and 
the forms of socio-political life to which they contribute.86 
The centrality of the exteriorisation of memory to contemporary experiences of everyday life 
and its transformation with and through digital media is notably under-discussed in 
geographical engagements with memory. Thus, many questions are implicated in the 
theorisation of an ‘industrialisation of memory’, presented in this article. Foremost among 
these questions, for cultural geographers, might be: ‘What kinds of spatial experience does 
this industrialisation of memory produce or inhibit?’ It is with the posing of this question 
that I wish to conclude this article. 
The industrialisation of memory enabled through a proliferation of ‘programmes’ that 
collect and retain data in our everyday lives, as outlined here, asks questions of the tradition 
within cultural geographies of the positing of places and landscapes as spaces rendered 
distinct through an accumulation and concretisation of memory, in situ. This is not to say 
that with contemporary ‘mnemotechnologies’, we no longer form personal and embodied 
memories – far from it. It is rather to suggest that a significant technical apparatus plays an 
increasing role in mediating and supplementing such processes. Whereas many articulations 
of memory (in relation to the production of place and landscape) figure the subject as an 
author and convenor of memory in-place, industrial-memory apparatuses ask us to consider 
other forms of agency present in the ‘memory work’87 that produces place. We can see how 
the industrialisation of memory might be understood as a system of flows, which sketches 
out the networks of relation between the various constituents of the processes of 
memorisation. Nevertheless, these systems are also, and always, reterritorialising both 
memorisation and recall. In this way, there is a kind of automatic and iterative concretisation 
of ‘memory’ and ‘place’ within the industrial apparatus of retention. The forms of 
programmatic memory I have described thus attempt to perform the kinds of ‘pause’ and 
‘permanence’ Tuan and Harvey, respectively, ascribe to ‘place’, with the corollary that they 
are digital and so also both infinitely reproducible (thus the topographical locus is not 
necessarily materially fixed and can be multiple) and capable of performing radically 
different temporalities – which can be very quick (through rapid deletion) or iterative (in a 
cycling of capturing, processing and over-coding the ‘same’ memory). 
If the urban landscape is increasingly mediated, and reshaped, with and through the 
industrial mnemotechnologies addressed in this article, how might we reconcile this with the 
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focus in cultural geography on ‘landscape as a concretisation and maker of memory’?88 This 
is, of course, a question with considerable scope, which demands significant further enquiry. 
However, by way of a conclusion and to begin to answer this question, I suggest taking two 
conceptual steps: first, to signal how we might read together established understandings of 
landscape and memory with conceptualisations of technically mediated spatial experience, 
and, second, to pose questions about how such a reading can accommodate the multiple 
forms of agency enacted in the industrial mnemotechnical systems addressed in this article. 
First, while it is implausible to review the full gamut of landscape studies here, we might 
consider beginning this heretical synthesis of theories of landscape and mnemotechnics with 
Don Mitchell’s reading of cultural landscapes in which he identifies two principal 
understandings: the ‘epistemological landscape’ – ‘landscape as the material revelation of 
human practice and thought’,89 and the ‘apocryphal landscape’ – ‘landscape as a way of 
seeing, especially a way of seeing that relishes the gaze, that asserts power by privileging 
perspectival vision, which, far from being a mere way of seeing, informs the actual, material 
making of places’.90 
One might begin by applying such conceptualisations of landscape to the examples 
already addressed within earlier sections of this article. Thus, a material revelation of 
practice and thought might be understood in the guise of the production of ‘software-sorted’ 
spaces. For example, the layouts of supermarkets and shopping centres are continually 
transformed based on the analysis of patterns of consumption and parambulation within a 
given location. Furthermore, we might consider the placement of screen-based advertising 
and the kinds of adverts they display based on facial recognition data. We might move on to 
consider landscape as a way of seeing through the multiple gaze of various 
mnemotechnically augmented individuals and collectives. Returning to the capturing, or 
perhaps eventalisation, of a live music event addressed in the previous section, the singular 
gaze of an individual through the lens of a smartphone is rendered multiple in the 
transmission of what is recorded to industrial mnemotechnical apparatuses such as 
Facebook, thereby constituting something like a ‘macro-collective’ gaze. Such 
representations 
arrange, order, include and exclude, they make knowable a space to everyone who might 
choose to look at these representations and also make it possible to compare it with 
another space . . . 91 
Whereas Hetherington describes, here, the refractive capacities of ‘traditional’ media such 
as text and photographs, digital media facilitate a pace and scope of a different magnitude. 
Thus, the ‘macro-collective’ gaze of digital mnemotechnical systems enables an iterative 
reterritorialisation through persistent operations on the representation(s) of a given 
landscape. 
However, both of these understandings of landscape do not quite account for the variety 
of collective and quasi-autonomous agency of the systems of memorisation addressed within 
this article. It is necessary to understand landscape neither solely as the product of a 
privileged individual (human) perspective or, solely, as a depthless ‘veil of symbols and 
significations’, nor, we might add, as the geometrically defined topographical stratum of the 
‘base maps’ of geoweb technologies. Following John Wylie92 and Rob Kitchin93 (albeit from 
rather different standpoints), we can understand landscape as a form of ontogenetic spatial 
experience: 
landscape is neither simply seen nor seeing, neither an object seen by a gaze nor a 
particular way of seeing. It concerns also the immanent relation which inspires these 
orders. As the folding inflection between ontogenetic depth and actualised percept, 
landscape necessarily partakes of or enfolds both these orders, both an enabling 
potentiality and a witnessed array of seer and seen.94 
Landscape is a form of spatial experience that is ‘beckoned into being through various 
practices and processes’.95 We can understand this beckoning as a form of transduction: ‘a 
process of ontogenesis, the making anew of a domain in reiterative and transformative 
individuations . . . [a] process by which things transfer from one state to another’.96 
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Landscape, as transduced by the industrial systems of memory that undergird many aspects 
of life, is a ‘metastable’ experience – that is 
a process that is in movement to the extent that it is: on the one hand, partially stable . . . 
and able to maintain its form . . . and yet, on the other hand, partially unstable, insofar as 
this form never ceases to become other than what it is.97 
Landscape understood in this way consists in metastable geometries of power,98 perpetual 
ontogenetic modulations of (human and non-human) materialities and sensibilities of spatial 
experience. Contemporary landscapes, at least those mediated by ‘mnemotechnologies’, are 
constituted as assemblages which involve the capture and retention of information, 
increasingly in real-time, about us as both individuals and populations, which is collected 
both passively or automatically and by our volition. 
Second, given an ontogenetic understanding of space as transduced with digital media, 
we might form questions about how we, as cultural geographers, might address the various 
agencies of industrial-memory apparatuses within our understandings of landscape. It is 
possible, as many dystopian accounts of the increasing role of digital media in everyday life 
do, to imagine a flattened and homogenous form of mediated spatial experience – akin the 
kinds of non-places about which Marc Augé writes.99 However, the assumption of the 
homogeneity and stability of data gathered may not be necessarily born out in experience: 
different interpretations, data and their performance in capture and recall are part of broader 
interpretive networks. Indeed, as Mackenzie and McNally have argued, ‘digital devices [and 
their attendant infrastructures] thicken as well as flatten worlds’.100 Nevertheless, the 
increased role of ‘mnemotechnologies’, employed knowingly and otherwise, invites 
searching questions about the kinds of spatial experience that are being transduced. How 
and what kinds of timespaces are being produced and performed with the range of quasi-
autonomous actors we have begun to discuss here? How can we address the transductions of 
spatial experience made capable by systems operating at rates (of speed and volume of 
capture) that are becoming difficult for us to oversee and within systems that are inherently 
opaque to their users? What does such a formulation of landscape do to the conventional 
idioms of self and landscape explored by cultural geographers? 
The emerging industrial apparatuses for the capture, storage and transmission of memory 
demonstrate a potentially sizable shift in the ways in which we govern, negotiate and 
understand our collective life. On the one hand, they place the potential for an extraordinary 
level of control over what is remembered, how it is remembered and what influence this can 
have on contemporary socio-spatial experience – where we can go, with whom we 
communicate and so on. On the other hand, these ‘mnemotechnologies’ are beginning to 
open out not only the access to but also the creation of shared, collective knowledge across a 
diverse spectrum of lives. The landscape of collective urban life, arguably now more than 
ever, hinges on the metastability of increasingly large systems of the capture, retention and 
recall, and thus spatialisation in many guises, of knowledge. As a consequence, the nature of 
mnemotechnical apparatuses, the infrastructures and software that drive them, and the work 
they do in the world are in need of sustained critical attention. 
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